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FOREWORD 
 
In light of recent trends in international agricultural markets, and in the interest of analyzing, 
contributing to discussions of and making informed decisions on how to address the complex 
problem of price volatility, we are pleased to present this first issue of the ECLAC-FAO-IICA 
Bulletin, prepared within the framework of an initiative launched by our institutions in 2009 calling 
for the annual publication of a document on the state of and outlook for agriculture and rural life in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.   
 
Since mid-2010 and throughout the early months of 2011, global food prices have been steadily 
rising, surpassing even the levels reached during the crisis of 2008. For those countries of the region 
that specialize in the export of raw materials, this increase in agricultural prices affords them a 
unique opportunity to improve their terms of trade. However, it may also be very costly for them in 
terms of decreased food security, increased malnutrition and possible social unrest, especially in net 
food importing countries. The persistence of volatility, which is the result of constant variations in 
price, will continue to create great uncertainty for farmers, added to the great risks already posed by 
climate change and recurrent pests and diseases.  
 
The countries of the region face challenges with respect to the implementation and combination of 
policy instruments, given the unique nature of and the limitations faced by each country.  In this first 
issue, we summarize existing evidence of the volatility in the food and agricultural raw materials 
markets, the implications of such volatility, and some policy options for addressing the issue. 
Recognizing that there is no magic formula for solving the problems volatility creates, we believe 
that the combination of policies applied by each country must address more than the problems of 
the short term and foster long-term, inclusive economic development that will increase equality, 
benefitting the most vulnerable segments of its population. To accomplish this, we believe that any 
agricultural development strategy adopted by the countries must include the implementation of 
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During the second half of 2010, increases in 
food prices again set off alarm bells in the 
international community.  The indices 
prepared by the relevant international 
organizations indicate that food prices grew 
by some 30% (in nominal terms) between 
June and December 2010, closing out the year 
at levels similar to those reached at the height 
of the rise in prices that occurred in the first 
semester of 2008 (Figure 1). This trend 
continued during January 2011, with an 
increase of 3.4% being reported in the FAO 
food price index 
 
Figure 1 
FOOD PRICE INDICES  
 Dec. 1991 – Dec. 2010 
 
Sources: World Bank, FAO, IMF, UNCTAD. 
 
This new round of price increases has focused 
attention on the issue of volatility and its 
causes, much more so than during the cycle of 
increases of 2007-2008.  Two fundamental 
questions emerge in the current context. The 
first is: how much of this increase can be 
attributed to volatility created by short-term 
factors, and how much to prices converging at 
a higher level as a result of structural factors. 
The other is: with respect to volatility, what is 
the role of factors such as speculation in the 
markets for raw materials, uncertainty 
regarding the pace of the recovery of the 
world economy, the application of measures 
designed to restrict trade, the declining value 
of the dollar, the over-reaction of agents in 
the markets to announcements of lower than 
expected harvests, among others.  The object 
of the present document is not to answer 
these questions, but rather to provide input 
for a discussion on them. 
 
 Volatility is determined by the speed, 





of variation in prices.  From a statistical 
standpoint, the greater the magnitude of its 
rate of change (up or down), the greater the 
speed of such change and the more changes 
there are in opposite directions, the more 
volatile a price will be.  
 
For the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC), volatility has different 
implications, depending on the relationship 
between the structure of their exports and 
imports and the behavior of the prices of the 
products they export or import. In addition, at 
the national level, the transmission of 
volatility may increase or decrease, depending 
on variations in exchange rates and the 
adoption of policy measures (See Section IV). 
 
The current high volatility in the agricultural 
raw materials market has important economic 
implications for those countries that specialize 
in the export of such materials. Using price 
data from the 18th century, Jacks, et al. (2009) 
concluded that volatility in the prices of raw 
materials has always been higher than that of 
manufactured products.  Consequently, 
dependence on the export of a few 
commodities is a fundamental cause of 
instability in the terms of trade by the 
countries that specialize in their production, 
and makes them more vulnerable 
economically. 
 
Volatility in the prices of agricultural raw 
materials can have serious consequences for 
countries: losses in economic efficiency, 
increased food insecurity, more malnutrition, 
negative impacts on their trade balance, 
possible social unrest and greater risks for 
producers, especially small-scale producers, 
due to uncertainty regarding expected levels 
of income. 
 
There is a broad range of policy instruments 
available for addressing the issue of volatility. 
However, the countries’ ability to apply them 
is determined by the level of development of 
the institutions, the existence of the necessary 
technical expertise and any commitments they 
have assumed under international agreements. 
In addition, some instruments that may be 
useful in the short term may not be in the 
long term. 
 
One of the big challenges facing countries 
therefore, is to effectively combine policy 
instruments, taking into account the current 
international context and social and 
production-related conditions in each nation, 
addressing short-term problems without 
losing sight of the long term, and considering 
any international commitments assumed and 
budget constraints faced by each country. 
 
The purpose of this bulletin is to review 
evidence of the existence of greater volatility 
in the agricultural raw materials markets, the 
implications of such volatility, and policy 
options for addressing the problem. The 
document comprises four sections. Section I 
addresses recent trends in the prices of 
agricultural raw materials vis-à-vis the increase 
in the first semester of 2008; Section II 
reviews the existing evidence of the existence 
of greater volatility; Section III focuses on the 
implications of increased volatility; and 
















I. PRICE INCREASES AND VOLATILITY, IN PERSPECTIVE 
   
When considering changes in the price of 
agricultural commodities, one must 
distinguish between changes in trend and 
mere fluctuations (volatility). Changes in trend 
occur over medium- or long-term periods and 
are due to structural alterations in the factors 
affecting supply and demand – in this case 
food. Volatility, on the other hand, is a 
technical concept, which refers to changes in 
rates of price variation over successive periods 
of time. There is a great deal of volatility when 
prices are rising and falling frequently.  
 
In recent years there has been an upward 
trend in the price of agricultural commodities, 
as a result of changes in certain factors 
affecting food demand. Among the most 
significant changes are the increase in the 
purchasing power of major segments of the 
population in countries such as China and 
India and the shift towards a more 
westernized diet. The price trend for most 
agricultural commodities during the past 
decade has been an upward one.  
 
However, volatility too has increased 
significantly in recent years. In fact, 2008 saw 
greater volatility than any year since the crisis 
that occurred in the first half of the 1970s. 
Factors affecting volatility are associated with 
more circumstantial variables that operate 
over the short term, such as supply shocks 
(for example, a poor harvest in a major 
producing country), variations in exchange 
rates between the United States dollar and 
other currencies, and expectations in financial 
markets (see section II for further discussion). 
The year 2010 was one of high volatility, be it 
as a result of overreaction to crop forecasts in 
some countries, the effect of climatic events 
(e.g., the fire in the Russian Federation) or 
changes in expectations about the course of 
the global economy, particularly with regard 
to the pace of recovery following the crisis of 
2008-2009.  
 
This section analyses price trends and 
volatility for major agricultural products and 
inputs in recent years, taking into account 
differences between product groups and time 
periods. Particular attention is afforded to the 
behaviour of prices during the crisis of 2007-
2008, as compared with the first five years of 
the 2000s, and to what has happened in the 
second half of 2010. These two periods have 
raised concern within the international 
community over the speed and magnitude of 
price changes for various agricultural 
products. The authors found, however, that 
the scale of the increase, the nature of the 
products involved and the degree of price 
volatility has been different in each individual 
case.  
 
Not all prices have behaved alike 
 
In real terms, since 2006, average semi-annual 
prices for major agricultural commodities 
have exceeded the averages for 2000-2005. 
The range of difference varies considerably by 
product, with four distinct situations 
identifiable (see figure 2).  
 
The first observation to make is the sustained 
increases observed in the prices of tropical 
products (coffee, sugar and bananas) and in 
non-food commodities (rubber and cotton); 
second, as of the latter half of 2008, 
stabilization at roughly 50% -100% above the 
2000-2005 average for edible oils (except 
peanut) and soybean complex products; third, 
an increase of less than 25% in meat products; 
and fourth, high variability in the price of 
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In the case of cereals, wheat and maize prices 
have behaved differently from those for rice. 
Compared to the average for 2000-2005, 
average semi-annual real prices for wheat and 
maize rose consistently through the first half 
of 2008 and then declined, until the first half 
of 2010, to levels similar to those in the first 
semester of 2007. However, both rose 
significantly during the second half of 2010. 
In the case of rice, by contrast, the real 
average 6-month price prior to the rise in 
2007-2008 was approximately 30% higher 
than during the first half of the decade. 
Following the jump in the first half of 2008, 
when the price reached 150% of the 2000-
2005 average, prices stabilized in the second 
half of 2001 at around 100% above that 
average. 
 
With regard to fertilizer prices, real 6-month 
prices prior to the crisis of 2007-2008 were 
already between 25% and 50% higher than the 
2000-2005 average. After the increase in the 
first semester of 2008, prices in the second 
half of the year returned to pre-crisis levels 
but then began to rise sharply again until the 
end of 2010. For example, during the second 
half of 2010, the real average price of urea was 
90% higher than the 2000-2005 average; other 
fertilizers increased at even higher rates: rock 
phosphate at 156%, potassium chloride at 
137%, di-ammonium phosphate (DAP) at 
113.5%, and triple superphosphate (TSP) at 
108.7%. These increases are higher than for 
most agricultural products and exceed the 
2000-2005 average. In the medium term, this 
exerts additional pressure on prices, since it 
affects production costs.  
 
Increases in the second half of 2010 
occurred across a relatively wide range of 
products  
 
The previous section shows that after the 
sharp decline in prices during the second half 
of 2008, most resumed their upward trend. 
Thus, the price rise of the second half of 2010 
may be viewed as being part of the process of 
convergence at higher price levels. However, 
the rate of increase and the contrast with the 
first half of the year have raised concerns 
about the role of factors associated with 
volatility.  
 
The price hike in the second semester of 2010 
was seen across a fairly wide range of 
products.
1
 In real terms, higher-than-average 
                                                 
1The data used in this section were obtained using online data from 
the World Bank (DataBank). The products used in that database are 
very similar to those used in constructing the FAO, IMF and 
UNCTAD indices. In fact, in most cases the reference markets for 
 





price increases were seen for food (37.1%). 
Prices for edible oils and fats rose by 44.0% 
and for grains by 52.7% - groups that had 
experienced declines of 6.6% and 18.5%, 
respectively, during the first half of the year. 
There was also a significant increase (34.3%) 
in the price index of other agricultural 
products (World Bank), including non-food 
agricultural commodities (cotton, rubber and 
tobacco). In addition, the fertilizer index rose 
significantly (36.5%), above the rate of the 
overall price index for the agricultural sector 
(29.9%).  
 
Major differences occurred within each group, 
however. The growing international concern 
is linked to price rises for wheat and maize, 
which, along with rice, constitute the main 
food grains and are a staple in the diet of the 
poor, particularly in less developed countries. 
In real terms, the prices of these products rose 
by 94.4% (wheat) and 63.9% (maize) during 
the second half of 2010. Large increases also 
occurred in the price of sugar (76.2%), coffee 
(30.0% for Arabica), palm and soybean oils 
(53.9%) and soybeans (34.1%). Among the 
non-food agricultural commodities, the 
greatest price rises were in cotton (80.6%) and 
rubber (33.1%). Particularly notable in terms 
of their impact on production costs were the 
jumps in the price of fertilizers such as urea 
(63.6%), TSP (36.2%) and DAP (32.6%), with 
these figures reflecting prices in real terms in 
constant year 2000 United States dollars.  
 
Behaviour of the volatility  
 
Volatility is the variability in the rates at which 
prices change over time. It relates to the 
speed, magnitude and direction of the rates of 
change in prices. Greater price volatility is 
                                                                         
the products, as well as the prices used, are the same. What varies 
from one index to another are the groupings, the products included 
in each group, and the weighting of the different products. The 
World Bank is the only source that reports prices and indices in 
constant prices (FAO began reporting constant-price indices in 
January 2011, using the same deflator as the World Bank).  
correlated with greater magnitude in the rate 
of change, whether up or down, with the 
speed at which the change occurs, and with a 
greater number of changes in the direction of 
variation (i.e., a combination of increases and 
decreases). Volatility is therefore measured by 
indicators calculated on the basis of rates of 
change in prices.  
 
This paper uses a simple measure of historical 
volatility (e.g., Jack and others, 2009 and Dvir 
and Rogoff, 2009), calculated as the standard 
deviation of the logarithms of the price ratio 
between pairs of successive periods for a 
given period of time. For each of the indices 
and products concerned, the measure of 
volatility is calculated for annual periods, 
based on data for monthly averages. This 
paper used monthly series of food price 
indices compiled by FAO, UNCTAD, the 
World Bank and IMF, as well as monthly 
series of real prices for various agricultural 
products compiled by the World Bank (figure 
3).  
 
The volatility of food price indices reflects the 
sharp increase in this indicator for 2008 and 
2009, when commodity prices first surged, 
followed by a sudden decline with the onset 
of the global financial and economic crisis. 
Regardless of which indices one examines, 
those years showed the highest volatility, 
though there were significant differences 
between indices, due to the different products 
involved and methodologies employed. In 
early 2010, food price indices once again 
became more volatile, although the variations 
were much smaller than those in 2008-2009. 
Volatility increased again in the second half of 
2010, however, as reflected in price jumps for 
a number of products - wheat, sugar, bananas 
and urea, as well as for others not shown in 
the figures (edible oils, beef and mutton, 
cotton and rubber). For some of these 
commodities (wheat, sugar, mutton and 
cotton), prices were more volatile in 2010 
than at any time since, at least, the beginning 






VOLATILITY OF FOOD PRICE INDICES AND OF PRICES FOR AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS AND INPUTS 
(Annualized standard deviation of the logarithm of the ratio between pairs of prices, December 1999 







Different types of volatility for different 
products  
 
Two types of volatility can be identified. Type 
I occurs when the average price changes are 
not associated with medium-term trends. 
Type II occurs when the price variations tend 
to follow trends in the medium term, but with 
larger relative increases, as in the second half 
of 2010 (Type IIa) or first half of 2010 (Type 
IIb). In terms of impact on the sector’s 
economic agents (e.g., sellers of inputs and 
producers) and the possible impact on 
consumers, Type I volatility causes the 
greatest uncertainty. Among the products in 
the group affected by Type I volatility are a 
combination of basic foods for human 
consumption (maize, wheat, sugar and edible 
oils), products important for human 
consumption and for the production of 
animal protein (maize, soybeans and soybean 
cake), raw materials used in ethanol 
production, which compete with food 
production directly (maize) and indirectly 
(sugar), as well as major inputs for agricultural 
production (urea, potassium chloride).  
 






Heading the group are products that are 
highly tradable in commodities markets —
wheat, maize, soybeans and their 
derivatives— as well as products that suffered 
production problems in some major 
producing countries, where advertisements 
may have caused markets to “overreact” 
during the second half of 2010. For example, 
data on monthly volatility calculated by the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group (CME 
Group historical volatility, 2011), using data 
from futures contracts, indicate that in August 
price volatility for wheat (one of the products 
whose prices surged the most in the second 
half of 2010) was the fifth highest in the last 
decade, surpassed only by the values of 
February, March, August and October of 
2008. This greater volatility in August 
coincided with the announcement that wheat 
exports from the Russian Federation would 
be suspended in anticipation of lower-than-
expected yields amid poor weather in major 
wheat-growing areas of the country. However, 
there were months of very high volatility in 
maize (November and December), soybeans 
(November), soybean oil (November) and 
ethanol (September and October), whose 
production relies primarily on maize and 
sugarcane, which also exhibited Type I 
volatility under the proposed typology. 
 
The products which show Type II price 
volatility, i.e., those more closely aligned with 
the medium-term trend, are mutton, cotton, 
coffee, beef, rubber, and the fertilizers DAP, 
TSP and rock phosphate. Several of these 
products are associated with shifts in 
consumption patterns (e.g., coffee, meat) and 
increased demand for industrial raw materials 


































TREND AND VOLATILITY IN PRICES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
INPUTS  























Dec 2009 – 
Jun 2010 
 
Jun – Dec 
2010 
Products with high variability 2010 vs. medium-term (2000-2005 vs. 2005-2010) 
Volatility Type I 
Wheat USA/HR 41.3 12.8 52.3 4.07 -24.1 94.4 
Wheat USA/SR 40.5 28.9 77.0 2.67 -12.2 69.0 
Wheat Canada 49.2 33.3 69.9 2.10 -9.8 56.5 
Maize 40.0 38.0 75.5 1.99 -7.8 63.9 
Soy 39.0 44.6 66.5 1.49 -10.0 34.1 
Soybean oil 56.4 61.1 92.5 1.51 -8.8 53.9 
Urea 90.2 63.1 93.0 1.47 -12.8 63.6 
Bananas 29.3 37.9 54.1 1.43 20.1 -6.5 
Palm oil 57.7 78.9 108.4 1.37 0.1 53.9 
Chicken 3.9 8.0 10.9 1.36 5.4 -2.1 
Soybean cake 39.2 50.4 66.8 1.32 -16.3 28.1 
Sugar 58.3 109.9 133.6 1.21 -33.0 76.2 
Potassium 
Chloride 
137.0 121.8 129.0 1.06 -20.6 11.0 
Rice 76.3 96.9 89.1 0.92 -26.1 20.9 
Products that, in 2010, changed in parallel with short-term prices (2000-2005 vs. 2005-2010) 
Volatility Type II(a) 
Cotton Index A 8.0 31.4 71.7 2.28 21.6 80.6 
Coffee arabica 55.2 84.9 138.0 1.63 19.9 30.0 
DAP 113.6 114.6 146.0 1.27 23.4 32.6 
Beef 11.3 26.6 29.4 1.10 4.0 13.4 
Rubber 110.6 205.9 225.0 1.09 26.4 33.1 
Volatility Type II(b) 
Mutton 7.1 10.5 24.3 2.31 15.4 8.2 
TSP 108.7 85.5 129.7 1.52 48.4 36.2 
Phosphate rock 156.4 134.3 170.3 1.27 37.9 12.0 






II. RECENT EVIDENCE OF VOLATILITY IN AGRICULTURAL PRICES AND 
POSSIBLE CAUSES  
  
Various studies in recent years have analyzed 
the causes of the crisis in agricultural 
commodity prices in 2007-2008 (e.g., Heady 
and Fan, 2008; Mitchell, 2008; World Bank, 
2008; Robles and others, 2009; Baffes and 
Haniotis, 2010; Sinnott and others, 2010; 
Shaun, 2010). Since many of the causes these 
studies have examined are structural in nature, 
their usefulness goes far beyond cyclical 
aspects of the price rises seen in these years 
and contribute to a broader understanding of 
the behaviour of markets for agricultural 
products and price volatility. Although with 
varying emphasis, a number of studies 
focused on a more or less homogeneous set 
of factors which were seen as possible causes 
of the crisis. However, most studies offer a 
qualitative, rather than a quantitative, 
assessment of these factors, and even those 
that present empirical results are cautious in 
drawing conclusions.  
 
The first task would be to list, based on 
baseline studies, the main sources of volatility 
in commodities in general, and in agricultural 
products in particular. Given that commodity 
supply and demand are relatively inelastic in 
the short term, supply or demand shocks tend 
to generate more volatility —or longer 
periods of excessive variability— in 
commodity prices than would occur in sectors 
where supply and demand can be more 
quickly adjusted to market conditions. 
Therefore, at least two types of forces could 
heighten volatility in agricultural markets: 
those that exacerbate the inelasticity of supply 
and demand in these products, and those that 
heighten the frequency and intensity of 
shocks. Both types can and must be addressed 
with appropriate policies; however, the 
complexity with which they have evolved in 
recent years has created uncertainty about 
how to interpret them in different contexts, 
what policies are most effective, and what 
specific effects may be expected for different 
countries and population groups.  
 
Valid questions in this regard include whether 
the factors contributing to the relative 
volatility of agricultural markets have changed 
in the last 10 or 15 years, whether new forces 
have emerged, and whether some of the 
structural particularities that make prices 
especially volatile in those markets have 
grown stronger. Moreover, there is the 
question of whether any new forces –or 
strengthened structural factors— have actually 
heightened volatility in recent years, or 
whether there are even newer risks on the 
horizon that could exacerbate volatility in the 
near future. There is the further question of 
how these forces act—specifically in relation 
to Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
And there is the question of how these forces 
can be expected to behave in the coming 
years. Comparison of the elements present in 
the food crisis of 2007-2008 with those 
involved in the crisis of the 1970s reveals 
some similarities, such as dollar depreciation, 
rising oil prices, inflationary pressures and 
widespread climate changes affecting world 
grain production. In recent years however, 
new elements such as biofuel production and 
the “financialization” of commodities markets 
have emerged, adding complexity to the 
current scenario. 
 
Gilbert and Morgan (2010) argue that 
historical analysis of markets for agricultural 
products shows no increase in volatility over 
time, and that episodes of high volatility in 
international prices, as was seen between 2007 
and 2008, are usually followed by long periods 
of price stability. In addition, recent 
agricultural market volatility appears to be less 
severe than in the 1970s and 1980s, with the 
exception of prices for rice. However, Gilbert 





peculiarities of the behaviour of agricultural 
markets, which could be regarded as posing 
an additional risk of increased volatility in the 
coming years or a longer duration of the 
current volatility than in past episodes. The 
analysis performed by these authors is echoed 
by other studies (Heady and Fan, 2008; Baffes 
and Haniotis, 2010) that examine recent 
developments in the functioning of 
agricultural markets in attempting to explain 
the peculiarities of the current price cycle and 
anticipate future trends in those markets.  
 
Supply shocks  
 
Climate variability  
Historically, the most recurrent source of 
agricultural price variability has been supply 
shocks caused by extreme weather events. 
Given the temporal and geographical spacing 
of these events, periods of high volatility in 
agricultural markets have generally tended to 
be limited to certain seasons, products and 
regions. Volatility is inherent in agriculture, 
which is subject to the vagaries of climate. In 
the past, such periods of volatility have also 
been limited, with a cyclical element adding to 
the structural trend of declining prices for 
agricultural products, as a result of societies 
developing and income levels rising.  
 
However, in recent decades, increased climate 
variability has become a major global 
challenge. The frequency of floods and 
droughts in the Americas, for example, has 
grown exponentially since the first recordings 
in the early twentieth century. According to 
the OFDA/CRED International Disaster 
Database (EM-DAT), the frequency of floods 
and droughts in the Americas rose twenty-
fold between the first half of the twentieth 
century and the first decade of the twenty-first 
(figure 4). These climatic disasters have 
generated crop losses worldwide, prompting 
not only fluctuations in the prices of 
agricultural products, but also famine in the 
most vulnerable regions.  
Figure 4  















































































Source: Prepared by the authors, on the basis of 
“EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International 
Database”. 
 
In analyzing the impacts of extreme weather 
events and natural disasters, it is common to 
separate the effects of the event itself (the 
threat) from the consequences of low 
resilience in the affected agents and locations 
(i.e., vulnerability). The greater the 
vulnerability, the greater will be the negative 
impact of similar threats. In the case of 
agriculture, resilience to weather events and 
natural disasters is primarily determined by 
proper management of natural resources, the 
use of early-warning and prevention 
technologies and the supply of risk 
management tools, such as climate insurance, 
making it possible to mitigate and respond 
quickly to damage. In developing countries, 
disaster prevention and risk management are 






still unfinished tasks in agriculture; thus, most 
of the global supply of various agricultural 
products, which are produced primarily in 
those regions, is particularly vulnerable to 
natural disasters.  
 
Some studies (World Bank, 2007; Gilbert and 
Morgan, 2010) have cited insufficient 
investment in the sector’s technological 
development, including some “invisible” 
issues such as risk management and the 
sustainable management of resources, 
especially among small and medium-sized 
producers,  as an important source of 
vulnerability to natural disasters and, 
consequently, of increased agricultural  price 
volatility, given the growing climate-related 
risks. The World Bank (2007) finds that public 
investment in agriculture is lower in countries 
dependent on that sector than in urban 
economies in transition, in terms of both the 
share of total public investment and, 
particularly, the sector’s value added. At the 
same time, international aid for agriculture 
declined in the last 20 years in absolute and 
relative terms, slipping from 16% of grants to 
less than 4%, although some efforts have 
been made recently to reverse that trend. 
Finally, in terms of adopting currently 
available agricultural technologies, there is a 
gap between the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean as a region and the 
countries of Asia-Pacific. For example: use of 
irrigation is 163% higher in Asia-Pacific than 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, use of 
improved grain seeds 23% higher, and use of 
fertilizers is 134% higher. Comparing Asia-
Pacific with Sub-Saharan Africa, the gap is 
even more striking —with irrigation use as 
much as 725% higher and fertilizer use 
1,362% higher in the Asia-Pacific countries.   
 
Public policy  
Beyond extreme climate events that affect 
agricultural production and its ability to 
develop in the region, a supply shock can also 
be caused by public policies. Decisions to 
increase export tariffs or withhold inventory, 
even at the same time as increasing supply in a 
given country or region, can tighten 
international supply, depending on the 
country’s share in global production and 
exports and the tariffs or duties involved. 
Several countries implemented such policies 
during the food crisis of 2007-2008 and, 
although there are no studies measuring the 
impact on international prices, contagion 
clearly occurred when various countries 
defensively followed suit and limited 
commercial exports of some commodities.  
 
Public-policy-driven supply shocks can also 
occur when supply surges owing, for instance, 
to tariff cuts (see section IV).  
 
Inset 1. AGRICULTURE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Climate change affects not only the amount of food produced through crop losses, but also crop productivity. Gradual 
change in climate causes atmospheric and edapho-climatic changes in the large producing areas, increasing agricultural 
yields in some places and drastically reducing them in others.* For example, in the Argentine Pampas, soybean 
productivity is likely to soar from 14% to 42%, while that of maize may decrease by as much as 17%. Wheat productivity 
could drop by up to 16% or rise by as much as 11%. In Brazil, the outlook for wheat and maize is more worrisome, with 
expected productivity falls of up to 30% and 15%, respectively. 
 
Soybean yields, on the other hand, could rise by up to 21%. In Central America, maize, the local dietary staple, could see 
large yield falls of between 21% and 34% in Honduras, Guatemala and Panama. Even more critically, bean yields in 
Guatemala could drop by 66%. At the regional level, overall grain yields could decline by as much as 10% by 2020 and 
by as much as 30% by 2050. 
 






Demand shocks  
 
Changes in income  
The most common demand shocks are 
income related. Upward trends in income are 
usually gradual, especially for the poorest 
segment of the population, who devote any 
additional revenues mainly to buying food, 
which affects demand for agricultural 
products. Drops in income, however, can 
occur abruptly, as a result of either economic 
crisis or cuts to social programmes (because 
of public expenditure procyclicality in most 
developing countries) - or both. Here, the 
effect on price volatility will vary according to 
the type of product, since the income elasticity 
of demand for agricultural products varies 
considerably between products that 
traditionally form part of the diet of a given 
population, products that have close 
substitutes, and those that are consumed 
selectively – this last category  of items being 
consumed by only a select income group and 
readily dispensable if income declines.  
 
Figure 5 shows how the price and income 
elasticities of various foods vary between 
countries and regions. As the figure shows, 
the lower the income level, the higher the 
price and income elasticities of demand. As an 
economy’s income levels increase as a result 
of development, demand elasticities tend to 
decline, which raises a major long-term 
question about the market for agricultural 
products.  In other words, markets could 
become more volatile as income levels rise in 
economies which are now in transition, given 
the reduction in demand elasticity (unless 
supply elasticity rises correspondingly). 
However, to gain a clear picture of the effect 
on agricultural markets, it would be necessary 
to consider changes in consumption habits 
among higher-income groups and 
opportunities for market segmentation 
through product differentiation brought about 
by higher incomes and greater consumer 
sophistication. Indeed, if consumers substitute 
meat for grain as their incomes rise, the 
ultimate effect on grain markets could 
potentially be an increase in the average 
elasticity of demand (as a result of the loss of 
consumers with low elasticity) and therefore a 
reduction in volatility.  
 
Figure 5  
Price and income elasticities by region/country 
and type of product 
 
Source: Prepared by the authors from USDA, Economic 
Research Service, on the basis of ICP data for 1996. 
 
New uses for agricultural products  
The discovery of new uses for agricultural 
products, driven by technological 
developments (such as the use of 
biotechnology in agriculture) and social or 
ideological changes, are additional factors that 
can, at least in theory, put pressure on 
demand in the short term. Although these 
changes are gradual, they often carry 
incentives (laws, investment decisions by large 





define their economic viability and mark their 
actual introduction in the market. These are 
the incentives that can cause volatility in 
markets, for although some of the trends 
might already be detectable, supply does not 
adjust in advance, but only once new market 
trends begin to take hold. Since agricultural 
supply is inelastic in the short term - 
particularly where investment has been 
historically low, leaving a major technological 
gap to fill - there is a period of misalignment, 
with excess demand and greater price 
volatility. 
 
Effects of the biofuels market  
The use of certain agricultural products for 
biofuels is a clear example of new uses of 
agricultural crops. Although the technology 
for producing ethanol and biodiesel has been 
known for several decades, the development 
of the biofuels market became feasible -thus 
opening up an alternative channel for certain 
agricultural products- only following certain 
ideological changes and recent political 
decisions, motivated mainly by the behaviour 
of the conventional fuels market. Although 
the political, economic and environmental 
changes that underpinned the creation of the 
biofuels market may be relatively stable over 
time, the relationship of the biofuels and 
conventional fuels market is not nearly as 
stable.  
 
Given that the prices of fossil fuels determine 
the usability, and even the production, of 
biofuels (and of agricultural products overall, 
since they serve as inputs), their volatility 
affects biofuels markets and, therefore, 
markets for agricultural products that can be 
used to produce fuels (primarily grains) and 
for other crops that compete with them for 
land, water and other resources. However, 
according to Baffes and Haniotis (2010), the 
level at which oil prices create a price floor for 
agricultural commodities is an analytically 
complex question; other factors such as 
subsidies, the mix percentage, trade 
restrictions and overhead costs for the 
biofuels industry, must be taken into account.  
 
A controversial study by Mitchell (2008) 
concludes that biofuels production in the 
United States and Europe accounted for 70% 
to 75% of the rise in food prices in 2007-
2008, because of more limited international 
availability of grains, changes in land use, 
increased speculative activity and export 
restrictions. The remaining 25% to 30% of 
the food price hike was attributable to high 
energy prices and a weak dollar. More 
recently, however, Baffes and Haniotis (2010) 
concluded that the impact of biofuels on 
rising food prices was not as great as had 
previously been thought.  
 
“Financialization” of markets for 
agricultural commodities  
Integration with other markets appears to be 
one of the main recent sources of increased 
volatility in the agricultural sector, as indicated 
in several studies (Robles and others, 2009; 
Baffes and Haniotis, 2010; Sinnott and others, 
2010). These studies address not only 
integration in a physical market such as the 
fuels market, or between different types of 
agricultural products, but look in particular at 
closer links between commodities markets 
(including the market for agricultural 
products) and financial markets. There are 
numerous reasons for the growing 
“financialization” of commodities markets. 
Among these are the growth of financial 
markets themselves, financial agents’ 
continuing need to diversify their investments, 
further deregulation of investment flows in a 
number of countries (at least in the years prior 
to the economic and financial crisis of 2008; 
see FAO, 2010) and increased availability of 
resources in recent years – an outgrowth of 
the economic recovery policies implemented 
in several countries, especially the United 
States. At the same time, given the prospects 
of growing demand for commodities in 





markets appears as an attractive alternative to 
other financing options.  
 
One measure of this growing 
“financialization” is the volume of futures 
contracts traded in agricultural products, with 
volumes increasing sharply in recent years, 
especially for grain. According to FAO 
estimates (2010), based on data from the 
CME Group, futures contracts on agricultural 
markets grew rapidly after 2000, and 
particularly since 2005, mostly in response to 
the deregulation of financial markets around 
the world. In the case of maize, the volume of 
contracts traded peaked in early 2008, while 
for soybeans and wheat the peak was reported 
later, in late 2009 and mid-2010, respectively, 
giving these products continuing appeal as an 
investment alternative, perhaps even more so 
after the financial-economic breakdown of 
2008. In December 2010, the volume of 
futures contracts on grains and oilseeds was 
30.5% higher than in December 2009 (CME 
Group, 2011).  
 
According to Robles and others (2009) and 
Torero (2010), the increase in contracts in the 
futures market for agricultural products is 
directly related to the increase in futures prices 
– and, more importantly, spot prices – in 
these markets. Thus, arbitrage opportunities 
underpin price rises to levels above what 
supply and demand behaviour alone would 
dictate.  
  
Transactions over 24-hour electronic 
platforms have also increased. Because this 
mechanism operates in real time, it can 
increase volatility and magnify agents’ 
responses to news and other events. The 
volume of electronically-traded grain and 
oilseed options on the CME quadrupled 
between December 2009 and December 2010 
(CME Group, 2011).  
 
The effects of growing financialization of the 
commodities markets are numerous, and it is 
not clear that the predominant trend in all 
markets is towards greater price volatility. 
Indeed, many financial tools available in the 
commodities markets were created to help 
manage risk and, consequently, price volatility. 
According to Gilbert and Morgan (2010), the 
futures markets, for example, allow the 
transfer of risk from commercial to non-
commercial agents, providing the markets 
with sufficient liquidity to meet the necessary 
productive investment cost, at a lower cost 
than through conventional means, since 
financial agents assume some of the risk as 
part of their speculation strategy.  In that case, 
increased liquidity allows supply to grow faster 
and at lower cost, improving the 
responsiveness of producers and potentially 
reducing volatility.  
 
However, the increased resources being 
injected in commodities markets respond to 
opportunities for making a profit in the near 
future, given the upward prospects for prices. 
It is not the growing demand in emerging 
markets that is creating greater volatility in 
commodities prices, nor is it the financial 
tools available in those markets (which, as 
noted earlier, may actually help reduce 
volatility). However, the herd-type behaviour 
by investors and the speed and magnitude of 
investment decisions in financial markets can 
indeed exert sudden pressures on demand for 
commodities, even globally, causing massive 
demand shocks in some of these markets.  
 
According to UNCTAD (2009), the number 
of participants in commodities markets and 
the size of their positions are not perfectly 
price elastic, unlike in financial markets. 
Therefore, relatively large shifts in positions 
compared to the size of the real market have a 
temporary or even lingering effect on real 
prices. This situation can be aggravated by 
three factors: (a) the “herd” behaviour of a 
certain group of “uninformed” participants 
who respond to factors other than market 
fundamentals; (b) incomplete information on 
the availability of inventories; and (c) 





“herd behaviour” with that of “uninformed” 
participants, use modern technical analytical 
tools to identify trends and anticipate changes, 
incorporating information from other markets 
outside the commodities markets.  
 
Thus, the speed and magnitude of investment 
decisions in financial markets can lead to 
sudden pressure on the demand for 
commodities, even globally. Although 
agricultural goods still account for a smaller 
share of financial investments than energy and 
mineral products, the resources devoted to 
that market are following a clear upward 
trend. As noted earlier, the integration of 
agricultural products and energy markets, 
through biofuels and agricultural inputs such 
as fertilizers and fuel, exerts additional 
pressure on demand for agricultural 
commodities.  
 
Effect on foreign-exchange markets  
Finally, there is an exchange-rate effect, since 
international prices of agricultural products, 
commonly denominated in United States 
dollars, are subject to the appreciation or 
depreciation of that currency. Shaun (2010), 
analysing the factors that drive changes in the 
longer term (more than one cycle) in the 
volatility of international food prices, found a 
significant positive association with several 
variables, most notably the volatility of 
inflation in the United States and dollar 
variability. The recent depreciation of the 
dollar against most currencies effectively 
pushed up international prices denominated in 
United States dollars. The impact of this 
increase in domestic markets, however, will 
depend on the exchange rate policy in each 
country. In countries with a floating exchange 
rate, rising international prices are usually 
offset by a roughly proportional appreciation 
of the domestic currency. Not so in countries 
that maintain fixed exchange systems, in 
which international price increases are passed 
more directly to the domestic market (this is 
discussed further in section III).  
 
Behaviour of the factors examined, price 
volatility and effects on the economy 
The previous sections attempted to explain 
the main mechanisms by which price volatility 
is transmitted in agricultural commodities 
markets, with emphasis on the emerging 
forces that are affecting global markets, which 
function as new channels for transmitting 
volatility or reinforce more traditional sources 
of price variability. These emerging forces, 
however, act differently in different countries, 
regions and even villages, affecting in various 
ways the economic actors whose responses 
will ultimately determine the magnitude and 
direction of the impact on price volatility. The 
differential impact of price volatility on 
economic agents will be discussed in section 
III. Here, a brief descriptive analysis is offered 
of recent trends in key determinants of price 
volatility, assuming that such trends will 
determine to some extent how volatility will 
behave in the coming years.  
 
In order to analyse whether a trend change in 
the volatility of agricultural commodity prices 
—be it in the form of more frequent price 
changes, larger price changes or, indeed, more 
prolonged periods of high volatility— is 
occurring now or may occur in the near 
future, three sorts of evidence need to be 
sought among the potential drivers of 
volatility: first, the presence of additional 
factors today compared to the recent past, 
without any significant reduction in previous 
factors (i.e., new factors have not simply 
replaced the old ones, rather, there has been 
an accumulation of new forces driving 
volatility); second, an increase in the incidence 
or variance of the traditional factors; and 
third, a decrease in economic agents’ capacity 
to respond to the occurrence of these factors, 
i.e., a reduction in the elasticity of supply 
and/or demand for agricultural products. 
 
On the first point, it seems clear from 





operating in the markets for agricultural 
products that could lead to a jump in price 
volatility over the historical trend; of these, 
integration between the energy market and 
financial markets would appear to be the most 
important.  
 
On the second point, the data suggest that the 
greater frequency of extreme weather events 
in recent years is probably the most important 
evidence of a worsening in the factors 
traditionally responsible for agricultural price 
volatility.  
 
On the third point, the relative slippage of the 
agricultural sector as a target for public 
investment, both in total amounts and in 
research and development, especially in 
developing countries with significant internal 
and external productivity gaps, could reduce 
the supply elasticity of these products in the 
short and medium term. At the same time, 
policies to support agricultural production in 
developed countries have historically been 
associated with limited pass-through of 
international prices to domestic prices and, 
although these countries have recently 
adopted reforms aimed at decoupling support 
from production levels, supply elasticity 
remains quite low for most of the products 
concerned (World Bank 2007). On the 
demand side, the market liberalization of 
recent years has likely had the opposite effect, 
increasing the pass-through of international 
prices to local consumers and thereby 
increasing demand elasticity.  
 
The effect of commodity price volatility 
extends to many activities beyond the sectors 
of production, with broader impacts on the 
overall economy affecting foreign-exchange 
earnings, government revenues, productive 
investment and, hence, growth. Sinott and 
others (2010) reviewed a long list of empirical 
studies on the relationship between the 
volatility of commodity prices and volatility in 
the terms of trade and in the growth rate, and 
concluded that all three types of volatility are 
positively related, that this relationship is 
asymmetric (i.e., different with prices trending 
upward versus downward, and at different 
levels of volatility), and that the intensity of 
this relationship depends on the degree of 
export concentration in commodities, which 
are subject to greater price volatility.  
 
One of the main mechanisms through which 
volatility makes the output growth rate more 
volatile is the increased variability of tax 
revenues from commodity exports, associated 
with the procyclical behaviour of public 
spending in many countries. Moreover, where 
exports and tax revenues are highly 
concentrated, institutions often deteriorate, 
which reduces the possibilities of obtaining 
public funds from alternative sources and 
reinforces dependence on volatile tax sources, 
sharpening the negative effect on the 
economy.  
 
Indeed, volatility is more damaging to the 
broader economy in countries whose exports 
are highly concentrated in commodities 
(Bhattacharyya and Williamson, 2010; Sinott 
and others, 2010). This is one of the key 
aspects differentiating the high-income 
countries, which are rich in natural resources 
but whose exports are more diversified, from 
the commodity-exporting countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, where the impact 
of volatility on the economy is much greater. 
In other words, volatility itself may encourage 
export concentration. Ideally, to prevent that 
from happening, policies should be deployed 
to diversify investment and support 
technological development in sectors deemed 
strategic - in terms of increasing the prospects 
for future growth, producing linkages with the 
rest of the economy, or creating opportunities 
for technological development in related areas 
- in order to counteract the forces towards 
concentration generated by the price boom in 







III. A LOOK AT THE IMPACT OF VOLATILITY IN AGRICULTURAL PRICES 
 
The growing volatility of prices in 
international agricultural markets is a 
challenge not only for farmers, but also for 
consumers and decision-makers.  Uncertainty 
regarding the direction that such prices will 
take in the future has complicated decision-
making for almost all economic agents. 
 
Transfer of international prices to 
domestic prices 
Trend and volatility are the most important 
components of variations in price.  The first is 
defined as a sustained increase or decrease in 
prices over time, and volatility as unexpected 
changes (up or down) in prices. Even though 
most of the studies conducted following the 
crisis in 2007-2008 have focused on analyzing 
the impact of the upward trend in prices, and 
overlooked the impact of volatility, they have 
yielded interesting findings.  The transmission 
of international prices to domestic prices, for 
example, determines the impact, on domestic 
markets, of the trends observed in 
international prices, which is important in 
determining the impact on both consumers 
and farmers. 
 
First, it has been shown that the transmission 
of international prices is greater in the long 
term. As a matter of fact, the trend in national 
and international prices is similar when 
compared over long periods of time.  In other 
words, while in the short term prices may vary 
independently, in the medium and long terms 
domestic and international prices tend to 
converge (World Bank, 2011). For example, 
using 76 countries as a reference, Hoyos and 
Medvedev  (cited by de Janvry and Sadoulet, 
2010)  found that, on average, only 18% of 
the increase in international prices during the 
crisis of 2007-2008 was transmitted to 
domestic markets, showing that the behavior 
of international markets has limited impact on 
the movement of domestic prices in the short 
term. 
Another study, which took into consideration 
wholesale and producer prices of corn and 
rice in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama and Honduras 
(Dutoit et al, 2010), found that most of the 
products analyzed were already present to 
some degree in international markets. 
However, of 19 products and markets 
analyzed, solid evidence of the transmission of 
prices was found in only five,2 which can be 
explained in large part by the fact that imports 
constitute a large share of total consumption 
in those countries and by the proximity of 
importing and exporting countries (Argentina, 
Uruguay and Brazil). In general, prices are 
transmitted to wholesale markets faster and 
more vigorously than to producer markets. 
Two of the factors that contribute to prices 
being transferred less or almost not at all are 
the market power of wholesalers and policies 
intended to protect producers (such as price-
setting). 
 
Secondly, international prices are more 
volatile than domestic prices.  A comparison 
of the prices of products traded in 
international markets, such as rice, corn and 
wheat, reveals that domestic prices are less 
volatile (FAO- OECD).  This is evidence that, 
in the case of short-term variations, internal 
factors exert more influence than external 
ones (the reasons for this will be presented 
below).  
 
A third finding is that changes in the trend of 
domestic prices are affected by several factors. 
Indeed, the extent to which international 
prices influence the trend in domestic prices is 
very closely linked to whether or not a 
country is a net exporter or net importer of a 
                                                 
2 The wholesale price of Brazilian rice, with Argentina; 
producer price of Nicaraguan rice, with the U.S.; 
producer price of Honduran rice, with the U.S.; 
wholesale price of Panamanian rice, with the U.S., and 





given product or is self-sufficient in its 
production;3 to the existence of distortions in 
the domestic markets (monopolies in 
production, distribution or processing); to the 
existence of substitute goods in the domestic 
markets; to the imposition of tariffs and 
restrictions on imports or exports; to 
distortions in the exchange rate, and to the 
existence or lack of close substitutes, as well 
as other factors. Several studies confirm that 
there is considerable transmission of prices in 
the case of some products and markets (e.g., 
wheat in Ecuador, Dominican Republic and 
Guatemala and rice in Mexico), and almost 
none in the case of others (e.g., wheat in 
Costa Rica and Panama and corn in 
Guatemala, Mexico and Honduras) (Torero, 
2010). 
 
A fourth finding is that there is also indirect 
transmission of prices to substitute goods.  
This means that the transmission of 
international prices may affect the prices of 
non-tradable goods.  To mention only one 
example, during the 2007-2008 crisis, the high 
price of rice led to increased consumption of 
potatoes in some countries of the Andean 
region, which explains in part the rise in 
potato prices in domestic markets. In fact, in 
Peru, the prices paid to potato growers 
equaled their historic high in April 2008 and, 
by December 2008, had grown by 80% 
compared with the same month in the 
preceding year. A similar situation was found 
in the case of prices for soft corn and plantain 
(Arias and Vargas, 2010). 
 
Another important conclusion is that the 
impact on consumer prices depends on the 
agricultural production chain in question.   
The transmission of the international prices of 
agricultural raw materials to the rest of the 
                                                 
3 If most of the raw material is imported, much of the 
volatility of the international price is transmitted to 
consumers. This is the case in Ecuador, where 95% of 
wheat is imported.  Therefore, its international price is 
highly correlated with the price consumers pay for 
bread (Paz, 2010).  
chain, and eventually to the prices consumers 
pay, is highly variable and depends on the 
nature of the products, on the structure of the 
chain and on the relative weight of the raw 
material in the finished product. For example, 
in those chains in which the relative 
expenditures on electricity, labor, management 
costs, depreciation of equipment, patents, 
packaging and taxes paid by the company are 
important components of the cost structure 
of an industry, the volatility of international 
prices for agricultural raw materials will have a 
relatively small impact (Paz, 2010). 
 
In addition, several factors contribute to 
lessening the volatility of domestic prices. 
One of the most important lessons learnt is 
that the countries with the greatest capacity to 
withstand a shock in international prices are 
those that, in addition to being open to trade, 
have adopted risk management strategies.  
Even though it could be said that, in an 
extreme case of delinkage from the market, 
price-setting can eliminate domestic volatility 
(provided there is no price speculation), this 
measure is very harmful in the long term. For 
example, countries closely linked to the 
international market can quickly begin to 
import food to prevent a rise in domestic 
prices, should a drought affect domestic 
production.4 Likewise, they can increase their 
exports to avoid a drop in domestic prices in 
times of surplus.  In addition to being open to 
trade, the countries with sound macro-
economic policies (exchange rate, trade, 
sectoral), as well as private-sector strategies 
for risk management (inventory control, 
insurance, future contracts, etc.) experience 
less price volatility and are less vulnerable to 
the ups and downs of the international 
market.  
 
                                                 
4 However, if a drought occurs in a country heavily 
involved in international trade, international prices will 






A final finding is that there are other factors 
that can increase the impact of international 
markets on the volatility of domestic prices. 
In domestic markets that are closely linked to 
the international market, it is expected that the 
difference between the international price and 
the domestic price will be determined mainly 
by the cost of international transportation 
(shipping), the exchange rate, tariffs, other 
overland shipping costs, as well as the 
marketing margin of the importer. In this 
regard, the volatility of domestic prices will 
increase, not only on the basis of changes in 
international markets, but also of the 
variability of exchange rates vis-à-vis the 
dollar, as well as the cost of transportation, 
which in turn will be influenced by volatility in 
energy prices. 
 
Impact of volatility on agricultural 
incomes 
For a farmer, the level and stability of his/her 
income are equally important. Both 
components are affected by factors as diverse 
as yields, the productivity of labor and capital, 
the weight of input costs in the value of 
production (input-output relationship), credit 
worthiness, volatility in the prices of his/her 
agricultural products and the inputs he/she 
requires, public policies in support of 
production, among other variables. 
 
Even though it is difficult to pinpoint the 
importance of each of these factors in 
determining the level and stability of 
agricultural incomes, it could be said that the 
most serious risks faced by farmers are the 
result of climatic variability and the volatility 
of agricultural markets. 
 
Thus, the impact of volatility will depend on 
the time each actor of the production chain 
has to make decisions.  There is a delay 
between decisions related to the planting of 
crops and to the sale of the harvest, which is 
the greatest risk for a farmer. A farmer who 
makes decisions related to planting without 
first knowing what sale price he/she will 
receive six or more months later is more 
vulnerable to unexpected variations in prices, 
compared with a merchant of the same 
product whose decisions regarding purchasing 
and selling are made in much less time.  For 
example, taking international prices as a 
reference, a corn farmer could face volatilities 
of up to 40%, while in the case of the 
merchant the figure could be less than 10%.5 
 
In addition, profitability will depend on how 
the prices of the final products and 
agricultural products evolve.  When the sale 
prices of agricultural products are on the rise 
and input prices do not vary, profitability and 
production will grow as a direct result of 
changes in sale prices, and will be limited only 
by the capacity of production to respond to 
the application of more inputs (marginal 
productivity of production becomes 
negative).6 In contrast, if, in addition to an 
increase in sale prices, the prices of inputs rise, 
production and profitability will increase only 
if the increase in relative prices is favorable 
for the farmer (See Inset 2). 
 
Additionally, price volatility has a negative 
impact on agricultural production and profits 
because it introduces risks into production 
and commercial activities that are viewed as 
an additional cost. Therefore, higher volatility 
leads to lower agricultural profits and, 
associated with this, lower levels of 
production, which in turn makes demand for 
inputs fall (Robinson and Bary, 1987, Torero, 
2010).  The current context, characterized by 
high and increasing volatility, discourages 
investment, innovation and the desire to 
increase yields and productivity in agriculture. 
 
Nonetheless, the impact on profitability is 
uncertain when volatility occurs during an 
upward trend in prices. At present, with prices 
                                                 
5 Monthly volatility and semi-annual volatility, for the 
last 20 years, were compared. 
6 The use of inputs increases to a point where marginal 





rising and becoming more volatile, in order to 
determine the final impact on agricultural 
activities it would be necessary to analyze 
them on a case-by-case basis. However, in 
general terms, the impact will be favorable if 
the positive effect of the increase in prices 
outweighs the negative impact of greater 
volatility. 
 
Furthermore, the impacts of volatility on 
agricultural incomes will depend on the 
existence or lack of risk reduction strategies. 
For example, a rapid and unexpected variation 
in agricultural prices will have less of an 
impact on farmers if they produce a variety of 
products and average prices do not vary in the 
same direction (negative correlations). In 
other words, a farmer can lessen the impact of 
a drop in the price of one of his/her products 
if it is compensated by an increase in the price 
of another. The possibility of reducing risks 
will be greater if diversified production 
options are available (depending on agro-
ecological conditions) and the correlation 
between prices is less or negative.  A possible 
difficulty in diversifying production is that, 
since the beginning of the crisis of 2007-2008, 
prices have followed a similar trend, which 
reduces the possibility of substituting one for 
another.  
 
However, the vertical integration of 
production can also reduce risks. In fact, the 
volatility of agricultural incomes will be less 
for those farmers who engage in two or more 
production processes, provided that prices are 
not perfectly correlated and that the volatility 
in the prices of final products is sufficiently 
less than that of the intermediate products.  
 
Not all famers have access to, or the capacity 
to participate in futures markets. Even in the 
United States, where such markets are more 
well known, the acquisition of coverage 
against variations in price is less common than 
might be expected, due primarily to the fact 
that the decision to participate in them is 
heavily influenced by the cost of such 
participation.  However, the more exposed a 
farmer is to different risks (production, 
marketing and financial), the more incentive 
there will be to seek coverage.  Farmers with 
high levels of indebtedness or greater 
probabilities of suffering illiquidity will be 
more inclined to acquire coverage.  In any 
case, the optimum level of coverage (which 
reduces risks to a minimum) is always much 
less than 100% of production (Arias et al, 
2000).  
 
In general terms, price volatility introduces 
risks into production and commercial 
activities that are viewed as an additional cost. 
A farmer will take the decision to become 
involved in a risky activity if he/she is 
compensated for the cost of assuming such a 
risk (Robinson and Barry); in other words, if 
his/her expected rate of return will increase. 
Therefore, if the volatility of agricultural 
prices is not accompanied by the expectation 
of greater profits, a decline in investment can 
be expected. In turn, the impact will depend 
on how much risk an individual is willing to 
assume to reap higher profits. Some farmers 
will be, but most are not willing, to become 
involved in risky activities. 
 
Impact on consumption and well-being of 
rural households 
When attempting to calculate the impact of 
higher prices on rural households, it is 
necessary to consider both income derived 
from the sale of agricultural products and 
expenditure on food. In the case of 
agricultural households in particular, the 
impact on the well-being of the household 
(measured as changes in consumption) will 
depend on what percentage of total household 
income is generated by the sale of agricultural 
products versus what percentage of total 
household expenditure can be attributed to 
the consumption of food. 
 
It is likely, therefore, that very poor rural 
families who are net buyers of food will be the 





Guatemala and Peru, for example, most 
families, including those found in agricultural 
households, will be impacted negatively by an 
increase in food prices.  The impact is even 
greater in poor families who spend a large 
percentage of their household budget on food 
(de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2010), Hernandez et 
al, n.d.). Evidently, this situation will vary 
depending on the degree to which they have 
specialized and diversified production, the 
percentage of their production earmarked for 
household consumption, “the terms of trade” 
of the household - between the products it 
sells and those it must purchase on the market 
- and the extent to which it is possible to 
substitute products from the family food 
basket. 
 
For example, Robles and Torero (2010) 
estimate that, as a result of the increase in 
prices in 2007-2008, the poorest 20% of the 
populations of Guatemala and Peru reduced 
their consumption of calories by 8.7% and 
18.7%, respectively.  Likewise, Zegarra and 
Tuesta (2008) estimated that the poorest 
families in Peru, who were also the most 
vulnerable to food insecurity, would have to 
have access to US$35 more per month to 
enable them to consume the same amount of 
calories as before the crisis of 2007-2008. 
 
In addition to the impact generated by the 
upward trend in prices, the concentration of 
agricultural markets  and other factors 
explained above cause the prices that rise on 
the international market to be transmitted 
easily and rapidly to consumers. However, 
when they fall, there are rigidities that prevent 
such decreases from being transmitted easily 
and rapidly to consumers, impacting 
negatively on the well-being of households, 
especially at a time when there are more net 
increases than net decreases in prices for most 
staple products, as was the case from 2000-
2009 (Bello et al, 2010). 
 
Inset 2 
EFFECTS OF THE RISE IN INTERNATIONAL PRICES ON THE INCOME OF SMALL-SCALE 
FARMERS IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
For the purpose of analyzing the impact of the increase in international agricultural prices on agricultural incomes, IICA 
conducted a study in 2009 that calculated the variations in the remuneration of all the factors of production (land, capital 
and labor) as a consequence of the increase in international agricultural prices in 2007-2008. The study estimated the 
changes in the gross incomes or values of production per hectare, as well as production costs per hectare, especially 
those of the component of direct inputs, which were also affected by the evolution of prices.  
The study calculated indexes of the net incomes of the factors of production, identifying groups of products classified as 
importable, exportable and non-tradable which, at the end of the process, were deflated by the CPI to obtain a 
measurement of value added in terms of their purchasing power.  
One of the most important findings of the study was that the index of the net incomes of the importable products (corn, 
wheat, rice and soybeans) showed moderate growth, even though the prices of these products were the ones for which 
the transmission of prices was the strongest and fastest in the four countries in which the study was conducted (El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, Peru and Honduras). This was due to much more rapid growth in production costs for this group 
of products. Despite the fact that the price of inputs grew much more than commodity prices, the weight of input costs 
in the gross value of production (input-output relationship) is relatively low depending on the technological level of the 
production chain, which lessens the impact of higher input prices. 
 





IV. EMERGENCY POLICIES AND THE NEED TO DEVELOP LONG-TERM 
STRATEGIES TO COPE WITH VOLATILITY 
 
Policy measures adopted within the region  
 
The countries of the region have responded to 
agricultural price volatility in very similar ways. 
Governments tend to intervene more when 
prices rise than when they fall; in other words, 
consumers and inflation have been given 
relatively more importance than producers 
and the productive structure of the agriculture 
sector. Moreover, policy measures have 
generally focused more on the short-term 
than on structural problems, even though 
seeking solutions to such problems could 
significantly reduce a country’s vulnerability to 
price volatility. 
 
Some of the policy responses implemented in 
the region aim to directly counteract the rise 
in food prices, by eliminating tariffs or by 
imposing export restrictions, or through price 
setting, government operations in markets, or 
establishing agreements between the 
government and the private agribusiness 
sector. Other policies have attempted to 
mitigate risk exposure in specific groups (price 
bands, in the case of certain agricultural 
producers), and to counteract the adverse 
effect of rising prices on vulnerable 
population groups (food aid, conditional cash 
transfers, school meals, food-for-work 
programs, temporary employment, and 
various other social programs). Lastly, some 
attempts have been made to strengthen the 
small-scale basic grain producer sector.  Table 
2 shows some of the measures commonly 
adopted by countries in the region, based on 
the scheme put forward by FAO (2011). 
 
What have developed countries done?  
 
Price volatility, which currently has a high 
profile on government agendas in the region, 
has been an issue for decades in developed 
countries’ agricultural policies. These 
countries have traditionally implemented tariff 
and/or countercyclical marketing policies to 
stabilize farmer incomes; and they also 
operate social programs to support low-
income population groups. Recently, growing 
concern about the volatility of agricultural 
prices has been explicitly included in the 
preparation of the new Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), and has formed part of the 
discussions of the 2012 Farm Bill in the 
United States; it was also a central topic of the 
summit of G-20 Agriculture Ministers on 22 
January 2011.  
 
European Union.- In response to the rise in 
food prices in 2008, the EU adopted the 
following measures: (a) sale of intervention 
reserves; (b) reduction of export drawbacks; 
(c) suppression of the requirement to 
withdraw land from production by 2008; (d) 
increased milk production quotas; and (e) 
suspension of tariffs on grains. This made it 
possible to increase domestic supply and thus 
help stabilize agricultural markets. In the same 
year, the EU carried out a “health check” on 
its agriculture policy to ascertain whether the 
CAP was in a position to deal with the new 
problems caused by food insecurity, price 
volatility and the economic crisis. In response 
to these challenges, the CAP will be 
reformulated as of 2013. The current CAP, 
however, has persevered with measures to 
address the problems caused by volatile prices 
when these fall to damaging levels, such as the 
purchase of surpluses (European 
Commission, 2008). 
 
United States.-  As was the case with previous 
Farm Bills, the current one, covering the 
period 2008-2012, aims to provide income 
security to North American farmers. Thus, the 
United States deals with price volatility mainly 
through countercyclical payments to its 
farmers when the market price falls below a 





complement the Marketing Assistance loan 
program and direct payments per hectare not 
linked to production levels (ECLAC-FAO-
IICA, 2009). In terms of support for 
consumers to cope with the price volatility of 
recent years, the number of people benefiting 
from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (which replaced the traditional Food 
Stamp Program) rose sharply from 33.5 
million to 40.3 million people between 2009 
and 2010; and in 2011 the number of 
beneficiaries is expected to grow by almost 3 
million, to 43.2 million. In 2010, the average 
support provided per person was US$133.76 
per month. 
 
Emergency policies but with a long-term 
strategy view 
 
There are no universal recipes for coping with 
price volatility. The most appropriate policy 
mix adopted by countries will depend on 
multiple factors, such as the specific features 
of each nation, its level of vulnerability to 
external shocks, its status as a net exporter or 
importer, its individual policy objectives, 
resource availability, etc. Nonetheless, a 
balance needs to be struck between 
emergency measures to be taken in the short 
term, and attention to structural problems that 
will make it possible to increase national 
agricultural output in the medium and long 
terms. The latter will target small-scale 
producers, given their major potential to 
increase food production and improve food 
security at the household, local, and even 
national levels. 
 
Coping with volatility in the short term 
 
The direction of short-term price movements 
(up or down) will require different 
government responses.  
 
Trade - To respond to the adverse effects of 
price hikes in the period 2006-2008, the 
region’s countries used a combination of trade 
policies, depending on their position in 
agricultural trade and their vulnerability in 
terms of food security. Several of the net food 
exporters, particularly those exporting grains, 
initially imposed restrictions and taxes on 
exports to ensure domestic supply; but they 
gradually replaced those barriers with more 
flexible mechanisms such as larger export 
quotas and agreements between the 
government and producers on domestic 
supply. In contrast, the net importing 
countries lowered import barriers to reduce 
domestic food prices and took steps to 
stimulate their own production.    
 
Consumers.- As higher prices make it harder 
for vulnerable population groups (the most 
poor) to gain access to food, measures such as 
food aid, the strengthening of government 
food programs, school meals, or temporary 
work programs can be adopted to support 
these population groups. Conditional Cash 
Transfer programs are among the measures 
that should be carefully considered, given 
their potential role in dealing with price 
volatility, varying the program (in terms of the 
amount of support and its coverage) 
according to changes in food prices. The 
region has considerable experience with this 
type of program, which has received very 
satisfactory evaluations. Conditional Cash 
Transfer programs could even serve as a 
trigger for productive activity in zones of 
extreme poverty. There are also countries (e.g. 
Malawi) where the Conditional Cash Transfer 
programs have been made variable to adjust 
to variations in food prices (FAO, 2011). 
Nonetheless, long-term solutions also need to 
be found; and it is essential that one of the 
key focuses of economic development policy 
be the inclusion of poor people (using pro-
poor policy instruments), because only by 
increasing their income will it be possible to 
improve their access to food and their 
capacity to cope with price volatility. The 
most vulnerable population groups live in 







Producers.- In the short term, price volatility 
is felt by farmers when prices fall below the 
expectations they had when they decided to 
sow their crop — a very common situation in 
all countries of the region and the cause of 
bankruptcy among many farmers in the post-
structural reform era. The short-term 
government response to a fall in prices may 
involve programs forming part of government 
policy, such as guaranteed prices, direct 
payments, countercyclical payments, 
agricultural hedging and insurance policies, 
contract agriculture, income stabilization 
funds and government purchases (ECLAC-
FAO-IICA, 2009). All of these require a 
certain level of institutional development and 
may need substantial government budgetary 
funding. It is therefore essential to invest in 
the institutional development of the 
agriculture sector, and lobby finance ministers 
to allocate larger budgets to it. The 
justification for larger budgetary expenditure 
in the agriculture sector, depending on the 
development level and specific characteristics 
of the countries in question, is widely analyzed 
by the World Bank (2007).  
 
Aiming at a long-term strategy 
 
An effective and efficient response to price 
volatility and food crises, which are highly 
likely to recur in the future, should include a 
long-term strategy to reduce both consumer 
vulnerability to rising food prices and 
producer vulnerability to sudden falls in farm-
gate prices.  
 
Trade - Although exporting countries may 
have incentives to restrict exports in 
emergency situations to ensure domestic 
supply, this can put additional pressure on 
world prices and damage both producers in 
the exporting country and consumers in net 
food-importing countries, many of them in 
low-income levels. Export barriers 
immediately reduce global food supply, 
creating a vicious circle in which confidence 
on the global market is weakened, provoking 
nervous purchases and new protectionist 
measures. Another area that needs to be 
strengthened involves trade and regional 
integration mechanisms to reduce many 
countries’ vulnerability to price volatility. 
Central America has experience in commodity 
trade facilitation measures at the subregional 
level, as well as in simplifying administrative 
procedures and financing for trade in food 
products. It is also important to develop 
domestic and local markets, lowering 
transaction costs for small-scale producers, 
and creating efficient fresh food marketing 
channels that connect production with local 
demand more directly. This can smooth out 
the impacts of unexpected fluctuations in 
world prices, for consumers and producers 
alike.   
 
Consumers.- As noted above, pro-poor 
economic development policies are needed, 
along with social inclusion for consumers, 
enabling them to increase and stabilize their 
income over time, supported by education 
and health programs, including the areas of 
food and nutrition education. Here again, 
Conditional Cash Transfer programs would 
seem to have a fundamental role to play, but 
they need to be complemented by other types 
of productive instruments, technical training, 
financing for microenterprise, etc.  
 
Producers.- In the case of farmers (many of 
whom are also among the most vulnerable 
consumers), a start should be made by 
reassessing their role in the region’s 
economies. It would be better to review long-
term international agricultural price trends, 
rather than short-term price signals, to define 
agricultural strategies in each country. Given 
the highly heterogeneous nature of agriculture 
in each country, producer typologies need to 
be developed, for the purpose of designing 
differentiated policy instruments and helping 
to develop market instruments to cope with 





required by large producers will be very 
different from those that are most suitable for 
small-scale producers. Increasing the 
productivity of basic grains and oilseeds, while 
also restoring, valuing, and promoting the 
production of traditional products (such as 
amaranth, quinoa, yucca, mashua, oca, olluco, 
etc.) in the countries of the region, will reduce 
vulnerability to price shocks among farming 
families, local economies, and countries 
generally. These products also have a high 
nutritional value. Nonetheless, higher 
productivity requires investment in 
agricultural research (targeting specific 
segments of low-income commodity 
producers), extension, productive 
infrastructure and local commercial 
infrastructure. FAO (2011) sets forth a range 
of policy instruments, with their advantages 
and drawbacks, for implementation by 
countries. These are summarized in the 
following table.  
 
Table  2 
SUMMARY OF POLICY MEASURES AND PROGRAMMATIC ACTIONS TO DEAL WITH THE RISE IN FOOD 




Expected effects Conditions Warning 




Export restrictions or 
prohibition 
− Medium and long-term 
consequences for producers 
− Downward pressure on 
domestic prices 
− Risk of contraband and 
corruption 




− Its risks and 
consequences 









Reduction of import 
duties 
− Reduction of the price of 
imported goods 
− Stimulus for exports 
− Decreased tax revenue 
−  Constant control and 
monitoring of prices 
−  Budgetary control if the 
fiscal deficit is large 




Price control − Consumers benefit from 
stable and moderate prices 
− Very likely to produce a 
negative impact on producer 
prices 
−  Risk of a black market 
  − May extend 














of Bolivia  
Production-oriented policies 
Development of value 
chains 
− Contribute to a fair 
distribution of value added 
throughout the chain 
− Concerted decisions, actions 
and commitments by the 
different economic agents and 
the government to improve the 
functioning and management of 
the value chain 
 
 
− Need for a degree of 
trust between economic 
agents and a willingness to 
negotiate 







the value chain 
Argentina, Brazil, 















Conditions on the 
recommendation 
Warning 
Where they are 
being 
implemented 
Production oriented policies 
 Government 
intervention in the 
market: 
“Minimum prices” 
− Increase and stabilize 
domestic supply 
− Reduce risk for farmers, 
encouraging them to increase 
production and investment 
−  The minimum price has 
to be negotiated 












Honduras   
 
Government 
commitment in the 
marketing/supply of 
food 
− Guarantee a market for 
producers and thus eliminate 
some agricultural risks 
−  Possibilities for obtaining 
technical support and, 
sometimes, inputs on credit  
− Contribute to investment 
−  Needs a good regulatory 
framework 
−  As a result of 
experience, it has been used 
mainly in commercial crops 
and, particularly, exportable 
food products 
−  In the case of 
food crops, 
producers are 
tempted not to 
respect contracts, 
owing to the 









Production subsidy −  Producers have access to 
inputs, encouraging them to 
produce 
−  Lower production costs to 
put downward pressure on prices 
or increase profit margins 
−  Requires good 
organization and 
distribution 
−  Inputs available 
−  In the case of fertilizers, 
ensure quality and 
distribute them in irrigated 
or rainfall areas 
−  Complex to 
apply  and 
regulate 
−  Marketing 
agreements need 














Coping with price volatility and attempting to 
avoid recurrent food crises is not the 
responsibility of any one country in 
particular, but a global one. Some decisions 
will have to be taken in international forums, 
such as innovative suggestions regarding the 
creation of an independent emergency global 
reserve and a virtual reserve, which thus far 
have apparently not been considered. 
Requests have also been made for 
commodity market regulation to reduce the 
effect of speculation on rising food prices; 
but the response has been slow (it was not 
until January 2011 that the United States 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
propose limiting the number of futures 
contracts that investors can trade in 28 
products, including agricultural ones); and 
some analysts still cast doubt on the 
relationship between speculation and rising 
food prices. 
 
In the World Trade Organization (WTO), a 
special safeguard mechanism for developing 
countries has been proposed, to deal with 
sudden falls in agricultural prices or 
substantial increases in imports that damage a 
country’s rural development; but discussion 
on this seems to have stalled. The countries 
of the region must not lower their guard in 
world forums, and need to participate in a 
coordinated and balanced way to avoid 
aggravating food-importing countries’ 
vulnerabilities, and avoid creating further 
distortions on the global market. The region 
must act as one on policies aimed at 
providing a regional benefit; integration blocs 
have not yet developed this type of initiative.    
 
At the national level, the key challenge is to 
deal with price volatility as efficiently and 
effectively as possible, given the specific 
features of each country. There is no unique 
recipe, but the policy mix must cut across 
circumstantial issues, pursuing inclusive, pro-
poor economic development policies, as well 
as medium- and long-term agricultural 
development strategies, with differentiated 
policies that take account of the highly 











SEMI-ANNUAL RATES OF INCREASE OF FOOD PRICE INDEXES FROM FAO, IMF, UNCTAD AND WORLD 
BANK 
(Dec. 2006- Dec. 2010, percentages) 
 UNCTAD: 2000=100 IMF: 2005=100 
FAO 
2002-
2004=100 WORLD BANK, 2000=100 




Beverages Foods Beverages 
Price Index 
Foods Beverages Foods Agriculture
Dec 04 - 
Jun 05 5.2 4.4 14.4 6.5 6.0 11.3 1.1 5.1 4.9 6.8
Jun 05 - 
Dec 05 6.3 10.1 -8.8 -1.2 -0.5 -7.5 2.5 -5.9 2.6 2.9
Dec 06 - 
Jun 06 11.3 12.9 5.0 14.6 15.3 7.2 2.5 5.2 3.7 10.3
Jun 06 - 
Dec 06 3.8 0.5 16.0 0.4 -0.8 12.9 8.7 12.1 12.1 4.2
Dec 06 - 
Jun 07 5.8 2.8 0.7 8.3 8.5 6.2 13.9 9.5 13.4 12.5
Jun 07 - 
Dec 07 21.6 21.5 7.7 16.0 17.1 5.1 24.3 7.7 23.2 16.9
Dec 07 - 
Jun 08 34.2 36.8 21.3 23.5 23.1 27.5 15.4 25.7 31.7 2.4
Jun 08 - 
Dec 08 -30.9 -27.6 -20.5 -32.3 -33.4 -20.8 -32.9 -21.3 -39.8 -36.4
Dec 08 - 
Jun 09 16.2 14.1 15.9 18.8 19.7 11.7 5.5 16.9 22.6 19.0
Jun 09 -
Dec 09 9.4 9.9 16.4 -0.3 -2.6 19.4 14.0 17.1 1.0 7.9
Dec 09 - 
Jun 10 -13.0 -15.9 0.9 -2.1 -2.1 -1.6 -5.7 0.8 -8.6 -1.6
Jun 10 - 
Dec 10 32.3 31.3 16.5 27.3 29.6 10.7 32.1 9.3 37.1 29.9
Source: FAO, IMF, UNCTAD and World Bank. 
 
SEMI-ANNUAL RATES OF INCREASE OF PRICE INDEXES OF GROUPS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
(Dec. 2006- Dec. 2010, percentages based on indexes 2000 = 100, constant) 






materials Agriculture Energy Fertilizers 
Dec 06 - 
Jun 07 4.6 8.3 19.9 1.5 -1.2 -4.5 16.6 7.5  24.0
Jun 07 - 
Dec 07 7.7 23.2 35.9 24.9 -1.0 -0.3 9.8 16.9  34.6
Dec 07 - 
Jun 08 17.8 23.4 16.8 37.3 20.4 6.6 16.2 20.3  91.1
Jun 08 - 
Dec 08 -21.3 -39.8 -49.7 -38.2 -19.5 -3.3 -50.8 -36.4  -35.8
Dec 08 - 
Jun 09 22.0 27.9 43.1 17.5 18.5 -2.0 33.5 24.2  -28.3
Jun 09 -
Dec 09 17.1 1.0 -1.8 -6.7 15.2 -3.3 47.3 7.9  -15.1
Dec 09 - 
Jun 10 0.1 -9.2 -6.6 -18.5 -4.0 3.3 21.0 -2.2  1.5
Jun 10 - 
Dec 10 9.3 37.1 44.0 52.7 14.0 9.0 34.3 29.9  36.5








SEMI-ANNUAL RATES OF INCREASE OF AGRICULTURAL FOOD PRODUCTS, BY GROUPS 
(Dec. 2006- Dec. 2010, percentages based on indexes 2000 = 100, constant) 























Dec 04 - 
Jun 05 16.4 -2.1 9.7 1.8 2.4 -7.8 2.5 1.2 -10.2 -5.8 -0.9 11.6 1.1 15.5
Jun 05 - 
Dec 05 -12.7 33.0 47.1 5.2 -1.6 15.9 -4.5 -4.4 -6.6 -11.1 2.4 -5.0 -3.9 -13.7
Dec 06 - 
Jun 06 -4.0 -0.3 13.9 5.4 9.7 16.8 -5.0 -4.7 0.6 -6.7 0.3 -5.8 10.2 -0.5
Jun 06 - 
Dec 06 24.5 0.5 -24.9 46.6 -2.4 4.7 9.0 0.5 -3.3 30.7 33.4 16.9 15.9 11.2
Dec 06 - 
Jun 07 -11.3 13.0 -23.3 -1.6 1.2 4.3 -6.4 11.2 -6.0 -1.6 31.9 9.7 14.2 16.1
Jun 07 - 
Dec 07 15.3 -16.8 14.9 9.1 11.6 65.3 0.5 -4.8 8.1 47.0 18.0 64.1 39.7 42.8
Dec 07 - 
Jun 08 -0.4 25.6 6.5 49.3 96.7 -11.4 27.0 4.5 7.5 28.6 19.7 8.3 23.8 13.1
Jun 08 - 
Dec 08 -18.6 -4.4 -3.1 -44.9 -29.7 -36.8 -30.6 1.5 -20.6 -41.1 -58.5 -41.4 -52.0 -42.1
Dec 08 - 
Jun 09 31.4 7.4 46.0 18.4 12.8 21.7 13.5 5.8 20.5 -16.1 50.7 55.3 26.7 45.8
Jun 09 -
Dec 09 5.6 -6.9 43.2 -8.3 2.9 -19.6 4.0 -6.8 -1.4 3.3 9.1 -10.1 4.4 -10.5
Dec 09 - 
Jun 10 19.9 20.1 -33.0 -7.8 -26.1 -24.1 13.4 5.4 15.4 11.8 0.1 -16.3 -8.8 -10.0
Jun 10 - 
Dec 10 30.0 -6.5 76.2 63.9 20.9 94.4 17.1 -2.1 8.2 30.6 53.9 28.1 53.9 34.1
Source: World Bank (DataBank). 
 
SEMI-ANNUAL RATES OF INCREASE OF NON-FOOD AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND FERTILIZERS 
(Dec. 2006- Dec. 2010, percentages based on indexes 2000 = 100, constant) 
 Other materials Fertilizers 







Dec 04 - Jun 05 11.4 23.1 4.0 5.7 0.0 6.8 -0.2 20.3
Jun 05 - Dec 05 4.7 15.5 4.6 5.7 0.0 7.9 -0.2 -2.5
Dec 06 - Jun 06 -4.2 58.3 -4.6 1.2 4.3 -0.4 -1.8 -5.0
Jun 06 - Dec 06 7.8 -35.8 7.3 -5.8 2.2 1.7 2.5 22.3
Dec 06 - Jun 07 -2.6 23.0 6.3 63.7 67.9 7.4 65.0 8.4
Jun 07 - Dec 07 14.8 10.9 0.7 36.7 68.7 21.9 25.9 33.3
Dec 07 - Jun 08 3.8 21.9 -2.7 85.4 155.1 109.9 118.8 52.9
Jun 08 - Dec 08 -28.0 -62.7 5.9 -65.3 -4.8 43.7 -61.2 -64.1
Dec 08 - Jun 09 15.6 45.3 17.6 -28.9 -71.1 -3.0 -43.3 9.9
Jun 09 -Dec 09 23.8 67.3 4.9 29.8 -7.1 -44.4 5.5 10.0
Dec 09 - Jun 10 21.6 26.4 -4.3 23.4 37.9 -20.6 48.4 -12.8
Jun 10 - Dec 10 80.6 33.1 -2.3 32.6 12.0 11.0 36.2 63.6
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